"Attorney-General of Canada v. Ward" by Petrasek, David & Egan, Suzanne
Attorney-General of Canada v. Wafd
Discussion Paoer #1
Refugee Iaw Research Unit
Osgoode tlall Iaw Schml
York Univerrity
Dnid Petrasek ard Swanne Egan
Principal Researchers
r990
This Discussion Paper is intended to provide a conrmentary on the issucs raised in the
Ward decision. It does not constitute a formal legal opinion.
The Refugee I-aw Research Unit has recently been established as an operating Unit of Osgoode Hall
Law School's Centre for Research on Public Law and Public Policy, and a partner of York University's
Centre for Refugee Studies. Its primary goal is to promote understanding of the Convention definition of
refugee status, and more generally to promote the humane application and progrcssive reform of international
and Canadian refugee law.
Among the projecs of the Unit, one of the most important is the preparation of a series of discussion
papers on issues of refugee law. I am pleased to introduce this fust discussion paper, dealing with the recent
decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in the case of Patrick Francis Ward, a citizen of the United Kingdom
and heland whose claim to refugee status was ultimately denied by Canada This decision is extraordinary in
is breadth, dealing with notions of agents of persecution and availment of protection, dual nationality, and the
definition of membership of a particular social group. Moreover, it has imputant jurisprudential value, as the
majriry judgment is complemented by a thorough concuning decision, which read together present most of
the major concems in relation o these three aspects of Convention refugee sbnrs.
It is our hope that this discussion paper will be of assistance to advocates involved in the process of
refugee determination, to decision makers, and ultimately o those charged with the reform of poticy in this
field. We welcome he comments of those who read this discussion paper, and look forward to a continuing
dialogue with individuals and goups concerned to ensure the continuing viability of the refugee protection
system.
Professor James C. Hathaway
Director
November, 1990
Tmonto.
INTRODUCTION:
The decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in the Ward case raises numerous issues of fundamental
importance in the determination of claims to refugee staurs. It is widely perceived that the malrrity decision
rep€sents a narow and resrictive interpretation of key provisions in the Convention refugee definition as
incorporated in C.anadian law. The following discussion is intended o provide a commentary on gggd, and, to
provide a framework wittrin which the issues raised in the case can be understood.
SUMMARY OF FACTS:
The facts in the Ward case can be briefly summarized. Ward was a citizen of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern heland. Having been born in Northem lreland, he was also entitled to citizenship
of the Republic of keland. He was a member of the hish National Liberation Army (INLA), a paramilitary
organisation which uses violence to further is goal of ending British rule in Northem Ireland. Ward de,serted
the INLA after a crisis of conscience over a hostage-taking incident. The INLA subsequently condemned him
tro death. He went to the Republic of heland wherc he was anested and imprisoned for two years because of
his role in the hosuge-taking incident Prior to his release, police officers in the Republic of Ireland old him
that they could not protect him from the threatened INLA revenge. They assisted him in obtaining a Republic
of heland Fssport and in leaving the country. He entered Canada as a visitor and later claimed refugee status.
The Immigration Appeal Board 0AB) determined that Ward was a @yg4gjgg refugee, and the Minister appealed
this decision to the Federal Court of Appeal.
ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL:
Ttree main issues were raised on appeal.l
(i) Whetler the IAB had erred in finding that Ward faced a genuine risk of "persecution" despite tlre fact that
Wad did not fqr stab-perpetrated harm;
(ii) whether the IAB had ened in failing to consider ttrat Ward was a national of the United Kingdom as well
as of the Republic of heland; and
(iii) whether the IAB had ened in considering the INLA to be a "particular social group" within the meaning of
that phrase in s.2(l) of the Qonvention refugee definition.
The issues were neither dealt with in this order nor stat€d in precisely these terms.
ISSITE I - Asents of Persecution/Availment of Protection:
Ward did not fear stale-pqperated harm. His specific fear was that upon release from prison he would
be killed by the INLA and that the authorities in hcland and the U.K. would be unable to protecr him: In
Zahirdeen Raiudeen v. Minister of Employment and Immieration, the Federal Court of Appeal held inter alia that
a claim to refugee status may be successful where there is evidence of state incapacity to proteclr Drawing upon
this decision, tle Immigration Appeal Board concluded in Wad that a state need not be complicit in the
pelsecution complained of for a claim to refugee sta$s 30 succeed Rather, it is sufficient if ttre state is simply
incapable of extending its protection.l
Before proceeding to a discussion of the majority's reasoning in @!, it is worttr rciterating why the
Raiudeen prirrciple is entirely consistent with a logical interpretation of the Convention refugee definition. The
definition rcads as follows:
'Convention refugee' means any person.who,'by rtason of a well-founded fear of persecution
for reasons of.... or. bv reason of
Drotection of that counFv..
Thus, the definition des not apply to peruons only because they have a well-founded fear of persecution for a
Convention rqason (race, religion etc.), but to those who, @l$lq.1sg are unable or unwillins o avail
themselves of the protection of their state. The Convention does not explicitly stipulate that a refugee must fear
s&fe-perpetrated harm.t Wftat !g fundamenul to the conception of refugeehood embodied in the Convention,
however, is the requirement that strte protection be absent In other words, it is only when the link between the
Reasons for Judgment, per MacGuigan J. at 10. In addition, there was some question as to whether the
U.K. would be willing to offer protection given Ward's testimony that he would have been rcfused
entrance ino the U.K. This issue will be discussed in section 2.
"...[A]n individrul cannot be considered a 'Convention refugee' only because he has suffered in his
homeland from the outrageous behaviour of his fellow citizens. To my mind, in order to satis$ the
definition the persecution complained of must have been commitred or been condoned by the s0ate itself
and consist either of conduct directed by the state loward the individual or in it knowingty tolerating
behaviour of private citizens, or refusing the individual
behaviour....(emphasis added)": (1985) 55
Reasons for Judsment, per MacGuigan J. at 11.
Of course, normally claims are based on a well-founded fear of state-perpetrated persecution. The
question of whether an individual's inability or unwillingness to avail herself of protection arose from
such fear is usually superfluous.
citizen and her state is broken by the absence of protection, that the individual is entitled to seek the protection
of other slales through a claim to refugee status.
Because the absence of protection, not the fear of persecution, is the fundamental prerequisite of
rcfugeehood, the Raiudeen principle is logically compelling. It does not matter whether or not the claimant fears
state persecution: what matters is whether the state is positioned to discharge is most essential duty, viz.
protecting its citizens from serious harm. Therefore, in sitrutions where it is demonstrated that the state is
incapable of protecting a claimant from persecution, whether ttrat failure is intentional or not, the claimant is no
less a refugee than if the persecution were state-p€rpetrated.
The logic of this pnoposition seems !o have been overlooked by the majority of the Federal Court of
Appeal in Ward. Ward testified ttrat the stat€ was incapable of providing protection, and the IAB accepted the
strongest possible evidence on this point - the express acknowledgement by state authorities of their incapacity,
thtough promoting and actively assisting his deparure from the Republic of heland. Nevertheless, the majoriry
at the Federal Court of Appeal disapproved of the Board's reasoning.
Writing for the majority, Urie J. reviewed the Raiudeen decision relied on by ttre IAB in irs finding that
sate incapacity to protect was sufficient !o ground a claim o refugee saus. He then went on to distinguish
between the motivations for not availing oneself of protection:
If a claimant is 'unwilling' to avail himself of the protection of his counry of nationality, it is
implicit from this fact that his unwillingness stems from his belief that the Sae and its
authorities, cannot Fotect him from those he fears will persecute him. That inability [incapacity]
may arise because the State and is authorities are either themselves the direct perpembrs of
the feared acts of persecution, assist actively those who do them or simply turn a blind eye to
the activities which the claimant fears. While there may well be other manifestations of it, these
possibilities clearly demonstrate that for a claimant to be unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of his country of nationality...he must establish that the State cannot protect him from
the Flsecution he fears.-On that basis the involvement of the State is a sine oua non where
unwillingness to prevail [sic] himself of protection is the fact6
He defrned the word "unable" as meaning:
...[t]tat the claimant cannot, because of his physical inability to do so, even seek out the
protection of his state. These imply circumstances over which he has no control and is not a
concept applicable to the facs of this case.
Reasons for Judgment, per Urie J. at 13-14.
Thus, Urie J. appears to have created a rather semantic distinction between the words "unwilling" and
"unable" in 0re Convention definition. According o his judgment, if a refugee claims to be unwilling to avail
henelf of the protection of lrcr state, she must prove state "involvement" or "complicity" in the persecution
fearcd. If she claims io be "unable" to avail hersef of protection, she must show that she was physically unable
to seek out this prot€ction.
What might initially Apear o be a useful distirctionl is, in fact, higtrly probtematic. The delineation
of the term "unwilling" as encompassing only situations where the state is complicit in the acts of persecution
constiotes an unhelpful and indeed, unprecedented confinement of the kinds of situations in which a claimant
might view henelf as unwilling to seek out tlrc protection of her state. Take, for example, the situarion in which
a statc is not complicit in the acts of persecution, is willing o offer prct€ction, but that protection exis8 in some
reduced form. Would the claimant in these cfucumstances not be (iustifiably) "unwilling" !o avail herself of the
protection of her sate? Under Urie J.'s apparent distittction, her claim !o refugee status would necessarily fail.
Indee( this is precisely the concern raised by Mr. Justice MacGuigan in the minority, in his holding that there
was no texural basis for positing a technocratic analysis of the word "unwilling" in the Convention definition:
...[] can find no warmnt for limiting the sense of is unwillinq o a single meaning. There may
be several reasons why a claimant is unwilling to avail himself of his country's protection. The
fact that tlrere are two clauses in the subpangraph is insuffrcient reason for holding that tlrcre
are only nro possible meanings, one for each clause. In my view the logical conclusion is that
there are at least nro meanings, but not necessarily only nro. There can be a single meaning
for the first clause, and a multiple meaning for the second.'
Furthermore, Mr. Justice Urie's defintion of ttre term "unable" as applying only to siurations where a
penion is physically incapable of seeking out the protection of her strte is inconsistent with the meaning which
was atributed to that ptrase by.ttte drafters of the 1951 Convention. An analysis of the travaux prdparatoires
relating to this phrase clearly show that "unable" refened originally to persons without a nationality, or in other
words, to p€rsons who did not have any govenment that could protect them. This possibility was later dealt with
Indee{ it could be argued that such a distinction is supported by the UNHCR Handbook in paragraphs
98 and 100. Handbook on hocedures and Criteria for Determininq Refuq€e Status Office of ttre UNHCR,
Reasons for Judement, per MacGuigan J. at 13.
in a second paragraph o Article I of the draft Convention which is now part of the currcnt definition and
Canadian law.e However, rather ttran delete the word "unablen, it was pointed out that it might still apply to
those with a nationality whose countries refused to protect them - by durying them permission to reolm, for
exarnple, or refusing to issue them a passport.
While the debates supptrt the notion that "unable" is applicable in cases where the state refuses
Fotection, they do not directly contemplate cases of state incapacitv. However, as jurisprudence under the
Convention has develq,ed, nunable" has also come to cover cases of state incapacity - a position which is clearly
reflected in ttre UNHCR Handbookro This development is entirely consistent with the original sense of the the
Serm "unable", in that, from a protection point of view, where persecution is feared but there is no state
complicity, it matten little whether the sate refused protection or was simply incapable of providing ir
The decision in Ward appears to run cormter to this trend. However, if this decision stands it is still
possible to successfully argue a claim in the absence of state complicity:
(l) The first approach would be simply to read the lVard case narrowly as not stating explicitly that an
element of state complicity is required !o prove persecution. Urie J.'s discussion on this mauer was clear as
regards "unwilling", but somewhat ambiguous regarding "unable". Although he did say that "unable" (meaning
physical inability) did not apply to the facts of ttre case, he also approved of the Board's holding that "...the
individual's inability to avail himself of his counqy's protection and the state's inability to offer protection are
inexricably intertwined".rt The crucial point on this issue for 0re majority was to refute the Board's holding that
S.2(l) of the Immiqration Act as enacted by R.S.C. 1985 (4th Supp.) c. 28, incorporating the Convention
refugee definition, defines the term "refugee" as applying to any person who: "@
!!49@8, is outside fte country of his former habinral residence and is unable, or by reason of that
fear, is unwilling to return to that country...(emphasis added)".
"...[W]here serious discriminatory or other offensive acts are commiued by the local populace, tley can
be considered as persecution if tfiey are knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if the authorities rcfuse,
or prove r{rlable. tojffg effective protection...(emphasis added)": Paragraph 65, 9}EI9L@4@8,
Reasons for Judgment, per Urie 1., at 14.
a lack of protection gave rise to a Fesumption of persecution.rz In other words, a narrow reading of the case
suggests that the @ on this issue was that a lack of protection does not lead to a presumption of persecution.
This, in itself, is an innocuous holding as persecution must always be slpwn.
Q\ A second way to take hold of a rather slippery issue is to return to the fundamental issue of state
protection. The core problem in Ward did not relate to the reasons underlying his motivarion for not benefining
from state protection. Ward may have been both unwilling and unable, or neither, depending on how those words
are interpreted The real issue was the subsantive nahre of the "protection" which was available. The problem
was not Ward's motivation, but the fact 0rat, regardless of whether he was able and willing, the state was
incapable of protecting him.
This suggests a different framewort for approaching cases like !@4! Where the state's incapacity o
protect a claimant is in question, the issue to be determined is not the motivation under$ing her decision not o
avail herself of the protection of her state, but rarher a consideration of rhe substantive natqg of the protection.
If there is clear evidence, as there was in Ward, that the protection is insufficient or non-existent, then it follows
that the claimant cannot possibly benet! ( i.e 'avail") from state prot€ction.
Issue 2 - Dual Nationalitv:
The United Kingdom (hereinafter "the U.K.") is composed of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and
thus all residens of Northem lreland are citizens of the U.K. (provided of course that they meet lhe conditions
normally applicable o obtaining U.K. citizenship, e.g. binh in the U.K., or naturalization). However, all citizens
of the U.K. who are residents of Northern keland are also entitled to citizenship of the Republic of lreland
(hereinafter "keland"). As Ward was born in Northern Ireland he was a U.K. citizen, but also, if he chose,
eligible for Irish citizenship. This option was in fact exercised by him when he applied for and was gmnted a
passport from the Republic of Ireland which he used o travel to Canada. The accepunce of the latter did not
dissolve his saus as a U.K. citizen as dual citizenship is permiued as between the npo countries.
The IAB held that Ward:
nNo such presumption arises. The determination can only be made after an assessment and weighing
of the evidence to ascertain whether or not the claimant-..has, on a subjective and on an objective basis
a well-founded fear of persecution for one of the rcasons set out in the definition. Thereafter the other
elements of inability or unwillingness must be addre.ssed": Ibid. at 15.
'...[i]s a citizen of kelan4 both Northern heland and the Republic of lreland. However, no evidence
was presented o the Board to establish that the claimant is also a citizen of the United Kingdom."3
Given the clarification above, it is obvious that the Board made a significant eror - Ward could no more be a
"citizen of Northern lreland" than he could be a citizen of Oxfordshire. This error merely compounded matters
with regard o its subsequent holding that it was incumbent upon the Minister to prove Ward's U.K. citizenship
if she sought to claim that Ward could be retrrned o the U.K. The Board itsef had de facto proved this
citizenship by finding as a fact that he was bom in Northern lreland"
The fact that Ward was considercd to be a national of both the U.K. and heland raises the issue of dual
nationality. In this respect, there are tno poinc of relevance to be considere( both of which were reflected in
the Court's holding that:
.-[a] refugee claimant must establish that he is unable or unwilling to avail himself of all of his countries
of nationality. It is the nationality of the claimant which is of prime importance. The right !o live in
his coun!ry of nationality becomes relevant only in the discharge of the onus on himself of proving that
he is unable to avail himself of the country of which he has established he is a national.r'
The fint issue raised here is whether a claimant who has more than one "corntry of nationality" must
prove a well-founded fear of persecution in each one. The Federal Court was unanimous in is conclusion that
the claim must be proved against each country of nationality. This is no doubt a correct holding, especially given
the comments above on protection. If a claimant has two countries of nationality - A and B, but only has a
well-founded fear of perserution in country A, it does not necessarily follow that she is in need of protection.
If she does not have a well-founded fear of persecution in counry B, she cannot claim an inabiliry or
unwillingness to benefit from country B's protection, unless she can show that her citizenship in counm B is
onlv putative or ineffective.
Putative citizenship refers to cases ivhere a person is not an actual citizen of that country, 0rough she
may be entitled o citizenship by virtue of ttnt country's domestic law.ti This scenario did not arise in Ward.
Reasons for Judqment, per Urie J., at 15.
Reasons for Judqment, per Urie J., at 19.
hrtative nationality would apply in sinrations of, for example, Jewish persons outside of Israel who are
entitled, by virtue of Israel's L4Iv of Return, to Israeli citizenship. Though every Jewish penon rnay
claim Israeli citizenship, a Jewish asylum-seeker should not be required o make this claim. Until such
a person is aqlggly a citizen of Israel, Isael has no great€r duty to offer protection (as a matter of
Ineffective citizenship refers to cases where a person is an acnral citizen of counEy B, but that country has
refused to extend its protection to her. For example, country B rnay have issued the claimant with a passport
of convenience only, on the clear undersanding that it did not entitle her to the normal righs flowing from
citizenship, especially the right to enter that country.
Applying ttris framework to the facts in @| an interesting asp€ct of the notion of ineffective
citizenship emerges. It appears tlr,at in addition to his fear of persecution in keland, Ward asserted a well-
founded fear of persecution in ttre U.K. on the basis that the authorities in the U.K. would probably refuse to
protect him.t6 This gives rise to the second important issue conceming dual nationality in Ward - must the
second country of nationality explicitly refuse to protect (by denying enmnce or a passport), or qan there be an
implied refusal?
In the Ward case, Urie J. held ttrat the onus was on the cliaimant !o prove that he could not benefit
from the protection of the U.K. Evidence was presented o the Board which suggested tlrat the hevention of
Tenorism Acttt (gfA) prevented Ward from entering Great Britain, (i.e. the U.K. minus Northern lreland). Ward
tqstified that as a former member of the INLA and because of two 'terrorist' related convictions he would most
catainly not be admitM to Great Britain. However, Urie J. held that Ward should have sought the U.K.'s
protection and thus implicitly found that the possibility of exclusion under ttre PTA was insuflicient prmf of a
refusal by the U.K. to offer protection. The essence of the majority decision, therefore, is ttrat Ward was obliged
to test whether or not he would be excluded under the PTA.TE Is this a reasonable requirement?
intemational law), than any other state.
However, it appears that Ward was alleging a p1[1ge! to prot€ct only with respect to Great Britain (the
U.K. minus Northem Ireland). It is implicit in ttre case at both the IAB and FCA levels, that Ward
feared tlnt protection in Northern heland, even if offered, would be insufficient If trere was no
protection in the Republic, then it must follow that Northern heland was also unsafe given 0rat ttre INLA
is based there. Since Northem heland is part of the U.K., and because both Urie J. and MacGuigan J.
only speak of a return to Great Britain they are thus indirectly upholding the 'local flight' principle.
Prevention of Terrorism Act @ Act, 1984 c. 8.
It is unclear whether the full effect of the PTA was entered into evidence. If it was not, this is
regettable given that the brmd language for exclusion under the !$ seems certain to have captured
Ward within its embrace as any person who "is or has been concerned in the commission, pre,paration
or instigation of acts of tenorism" may be exluded: PTA Section a(l)(a). Ward had been convicted in
1982 of, inter alia, 'contributing to acts of terrorism" Ggglggg_&LJgggmen!, Urie J., at 3) and in 1983
To answer this question we must rcturn to the notion of inability to benefit from protection. In the Ward
case, the U.K. had not conclusively refused protection, but the PTA was srong evidence of the likelihmd of such
a refusal. The rationale for requiring Ward o seeh protection in the U.K. is that the U.K. has the obligation o
protect him before any potential country of asylum. But where there is evidence that the U.K. may refuse to
protect, and that such refusal will lead to a re[rn o penecution, there are good grounds for holding that the
citizenship is not dfective.'e In @!, the likelihood of a refusal was apparently not sufficient for the Federal
Court, though the record may have been incomplete with regod to the qeration of the PTA.
Issue 3 - Membershio of a Particular Social Groun:
Of the five Convention reasons upon which a claim !o refugee satus can be based, "membership of a
particular social group" is undoubtedly the most ambiguous. While there is some debate as to the correct
interpreAtion of "tace" and even "nationality", the social goup category is perhaps the most malleable of the
Convention grounds for persecution. The nebulous nature of the term is both ic srength and its weakness, in
that it allows for a wide-ranging and flexible approach m locating accepted reasons for persecution, but in so
doing opens itself to the charge of creating indeterminate classes of persons who can bring a successful claim
to refugee status.a
It is worth emphasizing ttut it is the uncertain parameters of the social goup category which conditioned
the majority decision in Ward. Urie. J. was reluctant to include within this cabgory "...organizations whose sole
of"forcibleconfinement.forthehostageincident@UrieJ.,at4).Furthermore,
there is evidence that in a 1979 case, the British police orcluded from Great Britain a man who had
once been a member of the IRA, had served a brief prison sentence and, as he was suspected of being
an informer, was being sought by the IRA. The police in Belfast had assisted him in departing fc Great
Britain. Moreover, the operation of the PTA makes it clear that had Ward gone !o Great Britain and been
excluded, the UJL authorities would have sent him back o Northern Ireland: See C. Scorer, S. Sperrcer
and P. Hewitt, The Case for Repeal (National Council for Civil
Liberties: I-ondon, 1985).
Given the "reasonable chance' standad established in Joseph Adiei v. Ministgr of Emolovment and
Immiqration (1989) ? Imm. L.R. (2d) 169), it is submit
of assessing whether citizenship is effective on the basis that a refusal of admission to the counrry of
citizenship may result in a return to persecution.
It is byond the scope of this pap€r to set out a comprehensive framework for determining the proper
interpreation of the phrase 'membership of a parricular social group".
raison d'6tre is by force to overthrow the duly and democratically constimted authority in countries...where
unquestionably the rule of law continues to prevail'.2r That such considerations may no longer carry the same
weight given the incorporation of the exclusion clauses into Canadian law is no doubt useful to remember in
assessing the impact of Ward on Canadian case law.z
The majority decision in Ward cenred on the question of whether the INLA, a "t€rrorist" organization,
could constitute a "particular social group" - a question the Board, apparently without analysis, answered
affirmatively. Urie J. sesmed reluctant to accept an open-ended approach to defining social groups covered by
the Convention,a and clearly felt that some grcups were excluded.a According o Urie J., the line is drawn
between Convention social groups and other social groups on tle basis of shte-perpetrated persecution against
the group: "...[t]he persecution arising from membership in the group must arise from ia acdvities perceived o
be a possible danger of some kind o the government".2s This interpretation was supported by reference to the
UNHCR Handbook which defines a social group as comprising "persons of similan background, habis or social
status" and suggests that such groups may be persecute&
...because there is no confidence in the group's loyalty to the Government or because the political
outlmh antecedents or economic activity of its members, or the very existence of the saial gmup as
Reasons for JudsmeE!, per Urie J., at 20-21.
Section 2(1) of the Immisration Act R.S.C. 1985, c. 28 (4th Supp.), provides that: 'Convention refugee'
means any person who (a) by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution...m Aoes not incnae anv
F
to persons re,lpect to whom there are serious reasons
for considering have committed crimes against peace or humanity, or serious non-political crimes. The
exclusion clauses were incorporated into Canadian law as part of the amendments intoduced in Bill C-
55 Qnd Session, 33rd Parliament, 35-36 Elizabeth II, 1986-87, The House of Commons of Canada),
which entered into force on January l, 1989.
"It was he contention of counsel for the Respondent that any reasonably definable organization engaged
in nottical activiw may be included in the definition. If that were so I find it difficult to understand
why it was necessary to include in the definition the term 'a particular social group' when the term
'political opinion' is part of the definition": Reasons for Judsment, per Urie J., at 9.
This is implicit in his resort to the Oxford Dictionary definition of "social", which led him to the
conclusion tlrat although the INLA is a "social" group (because its members are "associated, allied or
combined") it was nevertheless necessary to ask whether "...it [is] the kind of social group, membenhip
in which provides a basis for a finding of a well-founded fear of persecution?": Reasons for Judqment,
per Urie J., at 10.
Reasons for Judement, per Urie J., at 9.
such, is held o be an obsrcle to the Government's policies.r
In other words, where the state does not have an adverse view of the group, persecution based on membership
within it cannot support a claim o refugee status.
In Ward, it was suggested that Ward's social group was either the INLA or, more properly, defectcs
from the INLA, buL in either case, state complicity in the persecution feared was not alleged. Thus, according
to Urie J:
...if the fear arises from within the group itself and does not emanat€ ftom the Statq whether
in the persona of the police or some other branch of government, it cannot provide the basis
for a claim of persecution.'
Since the state was rct complicit in the persecution Ward feared, his was not a group that came within ttre
definition.
The reasoning of the majority can be summarized as follows:
(i) Not all 'social" groups fall within the Convention definition;
(ii) it is the adverse view which the state holds of a group that crystallizes any social group into a
Convention social group;
(iii) where there is no state complicity in the persecution feared, a claim gounded only in social group
cannot succeed; and
' (iv) lenorist" groups are not necessarily excluded from the calegory ofConvention social groups, subject
to public policy considerations as to the propriety of protecting memben or former members of such
goups.
There are nvo significant problems wittr holding that a claim grounded in social goup can only succeed
when the state holds an adverse view of ttre group and is thus complicit in the persecution feared. Fint, as the
discussion above on Issue I indicates, there is no valid basis for holding that the Convention requires state
complicity for a claim o refugee status to succeed. If the state need not be complicit in religious, racial, political
or nationality-based persecution, but only incapable of protecting persons from this persecution, why is state
complicity a prerequisite to a successful claim on social group grounds?
Paragraph 78, EEB_!4!$@!, SpB note 7 at 19.
Realglrs for Judsment, per Urie J., at 10.
Second, numerous goups that have raditionally been recognizd, in Canadian and international law as
Conventiqn social groups would now be excluded For example, young men of miliary age in countries like
Lebanon have often successfully advanced social group claims, fearing not the government, but ttre various
militias threatening them with forcible recnritmenL The state in countries like Lebanon holds no adverse view
of ttris grcup, but it is incapable of protecting them. kbanon might be distinguished as a counry without a
government where the substituted authorities - the various militias in conrol of particular zones - hold the
adverse view of the group. However, in El Salvador young men fleeing forcible recruitment by the armed
opposition might be equally unable to secure $ate protectim despite the absence of government tlostility towards
the group.
The essential difficulty with making a distinction between Convention social groups and other social
groups on the basis of the governmsnt's view of that gmup is that it puts the cart before the horse. Do social
groups come into being only when the government views a group with hostility? Is it not tlp existence or
formation of the group itself which causes (and predates) the hostile government, reaction? lVhat is needed is
a concept of social group, like a concept of political opinion or religion, which will exist independently of the
naure of the persecution directed against ir To make the line of distinction benven Convention and otlrer social
groqps dependent on the nature of the persecution is o jnin ogether what should be separate assessments. The
confusion which resulg from such an endeavour is apparent in !{94.
Before leaving this issue, il should be pointed out that the debate in Ward over social group wits entircly
unnecessary as fte claim should have been anchced in political, not social group grounds. The INLA had
sentenced Ward to death because of his desertion from the goup based on his opposition to their methods of
advancing political goals. "Political opinion' is interpreted broadtf and could easily have embrraced the reason
for Ward's fear. It is suggested, therefore, that where a claim has a political basis, it is advisable not !o argue
lhe claim on the ground of membership of a paniculu social group, u least until there is broader consensu on
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the proper means of distinguishing between Conven$on social groups and other social groups.
